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COJKRIGHT DEPOSm 



The Operations of the British 
Army in the Present War 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 



The Operations of the British 
Army in the Present War 



THE RETREAT 
FROM MONS 

WITH A PREFACE BY 
FIELD MARSHAL LORD FRENCH 



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BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

1917 






• Q^ 



COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



Published July 1Q17 



V 

JUL 24 1917 



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PREFACE 

I AM told that it has been thought 
advisable to publish short accounts 
in pamphlet form of prominent 
and important operations which 
have been carried on during the 
course of the war which is still 
raging. 

Such war stories may undoubt- 
edly be beneficial, and in the be- 
lief that such "propaganda" is 
productive of more good than 
harm I have consented to indite 
this very brief preface to The Re^ 
treat from Mons. 

Any hesitation I may have felt 
arises from my profound convic- 
tion that no history of a war or any 
part of a war can be worth any- 



vi PREFACE 

thing until some period after peace 
has been made and the full facts 
are known and understood. 

This pamphlet however, is not 
so much a "history" as an inter- 
esting summary or a chronology 
of leading events, and the writer 
carefully avoids according praise 
or blame in connection with any 
event or group of events which can 
ever become the subject of con- 
troversy. 

In a Preface to so brief and so 
unpretentious a military work as 
this, it is impossible to put before 
the reader more than a glimpse of 
the situation in regard to which 
plans had to be conceived and put 
into execution as suddenly and 
speedily as the demand for them 
was unexpected. 



PREFACE vii 

That it is the '* unexpected" 
which generally happens in war, 
and that it is the "unexpected" for 
which we must be ever ready, has 
of late years been deeply instilled 
in the mind of the British officer. 
A cardinal axiom in his military 
creed is that he must never be 
taken by surprise. 

When, therefore, the Germans, 
on the same principle as they sub- 
sequently used poison-gas, sank 
hospital ships, and disregarded 
every known rule of civilized war, 
suddenly and quite unexpectedly 
overran a neutral country in such 
a drastic manner as to nullify all 
preconceived plans and possibili- 
ties, and the British Army found 
itself on the outer flank of the 
threatened line exposed to the full 



viii PREFACE 

weight of the German menace, it 
was this previous careful training 
which formed the sure foundation 
upon which to plan and conduct 
the inevitable retreat and carry it 
to a successful conclusion. 

When men are told to retire 
without fighting, when they see no 
reason for it, when they remain 
full of ardour and longing to get 
at the enemy, and are not allowed 
to, demoralization is very apt to 
be the result. Why was such a 
feature of the Retreat conspicuous 
by its complete non-existence .^^ Be- 
cause of another result of British 
military training, namely, the ab- 
solute confidence of the men in 
their leaders and officers and the 
wonderful mutual understanding 
which existed between them. 



PREFACE ix 

The magnificent spirit which 
animated the British Expedition- 
ary Force was seen at every phase 
of these operations; in the skilful 
handling and moral superiority of 
the cavalry which covered the Re- 
treat; in the able conduct by the 
respective leaders of the several 
battles and encounters which local 
circumstances rendered necessary; 
and lastly, in the extraordinary 
marching powers and capability 
of endurance which animated all 
ranks. 

Controversies loud and bitter 
will certainly rage in regard to all 
the dispositions and plans under 
which this war has been conducted; 
as to the operations of the first 
three weeks, perhaps, more than 
as to those of any other period. 



X PREFACE 

But I venture to hope and believe 
that no sane person can dispute in 
the smallest particular the claims 
which I make in this very short 
Preface on behalf of the forces 
which it is the great pride and glory 
of my life to have commanded. 

French 

Whitehall 
April 23, 1917. 



The Operations of the British 
Army in the Present War 



INTRODUCTORY 



The Operations of the British 
Army in the Present War 

INTRODUCTORY 

The first quality of British mil- 
itary operations in the present war 
— and so it will strike the future 
historian — is their astonishing 
variety and range. Beginning on 
the ancient battlefields of France 
and Flanders, they have spread, 
in a series of expanding and appar- 
ently inevitable waves, over a 
good part of three continents, so 
that, wherever the enemy was to be 
found, — whether in Europe, or 
Asia, or Africa, or in the islands 



4 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

of the high seas, — there also, 
sooner or later, were the British 
arms. There was a time when one 
or two campaigns were thought 
amply sufficient for the military 
energies of the most warlike nation. 
We have never pretended to be 
warlike, meeting our emergencies 
always, with a certain reluctance, 
as they arose; but in the present 
war we have seldom had fewer than 
SIX considerable campaigns on our 
hands at one time, and these in 
areas separated often by thousands 
of miles from one another and from 
us. It is one of the obligations of a 
great empire at war that it should 
be so; it is one of the privileges of 
a great maritime empire that it 
should be possible. It is undoubt- 
edly the grand characteristic of the 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 5 

operations of the British Army in 
this war, and gives the only true 
perspective of our mihtary effort 
in the field. To our share in the 
Allied front must always be added 
the fighting frontiers of the Em- 
pire. 

The British Army, now grown 
out of all recognition, was small, 
and known to be small, when the 
war began. It was a voluntary 
army, numbering approximately 
700,000 men, of whom about 
450,000 (including reservists) were 
trained soldiers, liable for service 
abroad, and the remainder, a half- 
trained Territorial Force, enrolled 
for service at home. Besides being 
small, it was, from the nature of 
its duties, widely scattered. Over 
100,000 of our best troops were 



6 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

serving at the time in India or on 
foreign stations. For all purposes, 
therefore, when war broke out, we 
had in this country a mobilizable 
army of something under 600,000 
trained and half -trained men, 250,- 
000 of whom were liable only for 
service at home. The striking or 
Expeditionary Force of this army 
was a fully equipped and highly 
professional body of six infantry 
divisions and one division of cav- 
alry, and with this force we entered 
the war. Intended primarily, as its 
name implied, for protective or 
punitive operations within the Em- 
pire, it was on a scale proportionate 
to its purpose and to the size of our 
army. Our army, judged by a 
European standard, being small, 
our Expeditionary Force, judged 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 7 

by that standard, was diminutive; 
and the chief problem which con- 
fronted the Government, when it 
was decided to send this force to 
France, was how to support and 
supplement it. The story of how 
this problem was faced and over- 
come, of how "Home Service" 
men became ''Foreign Service" 
in a day, and our little army of 
700,000, by a gigantic effort of 
British determination and Imperial 
good-will, was expanded into an 
army of millions — all this is a 
separate narrative, to be related 
elsewhere; but we cannot afford to 
overlook it as we follow the for- 
tunes of the Expeditionary Force 
in France and Flanders. It is the 
military background of all their 
triumphs and vicissitudes, and had 



8 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

an effect upon the tone of the war 
almost from the first. Even to our 
Expeditionary Force itself, with 
all its cheerful self-confidence and 
eflSciency, it meant something to 
know that the country was in ear- 
nest; that as early as August 23, 
while they were still fighting among 
the coal-pits of Mons, the first 
100,000 volunteers had been en- 
rolled, and were already deep in 
the mysteries of forming fours. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 

When a country goes to war the 
first test of its military efficiency is 
the mobihzation of its army. This 
is a stage in the history of wars 
which the pubUc is apt to overlook, 
because the arrangements are nec- 
essarily secret and complex, and 
are carried out in that first hush 
which precedes communiques and 
great conflicts in the field. It is 
nevertheless true that every war 
starts in the Department of the 
Quartermaster General, and that by 
the nature of this start the issue of 
a war may be decided. We started 
well. From August 5, when mobili- 
zation began, : — in spite of bank 
holidays and Territorials en route 



12 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

for summer camps, — the whole 
scheme of concentration and des- 
patch was carried out almost ex- 
actly to schedule, and without a 
hitch. It is calculated that, dur- 
ing the busiest period, the railway 
companies, now under Govern- 
ment control and brilliantly di- 
rected by an executive committee 
of general managers, were able to 
run as many as eighteen hundred 
special trains in five days, an aver- 
age of three hundred and sixty 
trains a day, and all up to time. 
The concentration of the Home 
Forces and of the Expeditionary 
Force proceeded concurrently. On 
August 9 the first elements of the 
Force embarked, and nine days 
later the greater part of it had 
been landed in France, and was 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 13 

moving by way of Amiens to its 
unknown fortmies. The smooth- 
ness, rapidity, above all the se- 
crecy with which the transporta- 
tion was carried out, made a great 
impression at the time, and will 
always be admired. The question 
of how it was done excited, char- 
acteristically enough, less interest. 
We are a people accustomed to 
happy improvisations, and it was 
generally assumed that this national 
talent had once more come to our 
rescue; the truth being that in 
these matters improvisation can 
seldom be happy, and that for 
instant and complete success the 
only method is long and careful 
preparation in time of peace. For 
several years the military, naval, 
and civilian authorities concerned 



14 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

had been engaged upon such a 
scheme of preparation, and had, 
indeed, concluded their labours 
not many months before war broke 
out. When the day came all rail- 
way and naval transport officers 
were at their posts, and the Rail- 
way Executive Committee, in its 
offices in Parliament Street, was 
calmly carrying out a time-table 
with every detail of which it had 
long been familiar. Such perfect 
preparedness is rare in our history, 
and worthy of note. Amidst the 
vast unreadiness of the nation for 
war the despatch of the Expedi- 
tionary Force, and the magnificent 
readiness of the fleet which made it 
possible, stand out in grand relief, 
not to be lost sight of or forgotten. 
The Expeditionary Force was 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 15 

commanded by Field Marshal Sir 
John French, and consisted, up to 
August 23, of four complete divi- 
sions of infantry (the First, Second, 
Third, and Fifth) and five brigades 
of cavalry; that is to say, about 
80,000 men. On August 24 it was 
joined by the Nineteenth Infantry 
Brigade, which added 4000 more; 
and on August 25 by the Fourth 
Division, which added another 
17,000. Our total strength, there- 
fore, during the fighting at Mons 
and in the Retreat, varied from 
80,000 to a little over 100,000 men. 
It was a small force, but of a 
quality rarely seen. No finer fight- 
ing unit ever entered the field. In 
physique and equipment, in pro- 
fessional training and experience 
of war, in that quality of skilful 



16 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

and cheerful tenacity against odds 
which distinguishes the veteran, it 
was probably unrivalled by any 
body of troops of its time. The 
French, who gave our men a warm 
welcome, dwell always on their 
youth and good spirits, their won- 
derful cleanness and healthiness, 
the excellence of their equipment, 
and their universal courtesy. 

"A Argenteuil-Triage," writes a 
French infantryman who fought 
in the Retreat and on the Marne, 
"nous croisons un train de fan- 
tassins anglais; figures rasees, ou- 
vertes, enfantines, riant de toutes 
leurs dents. lis sont reluisants de 
proprete. Nous nous acclamons 
reciproquement." (Sept. 2/14: 
Garnet de Route; Roujons.) 

At Bucy-le-long the French re- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 17 

lieve the English. It is a matter of 
outposts. "De deux cents metres 
en deux cents metres, un groupe de 
six Anglais est couche a plat ventre 
dans les betteraves, en bordure 
d'un chemin. lis se dressent et 
nous allons prendre leurs places 
en admirant ces beaux soldats, 
bien equipes, silencieux, et qui 
ont des couvertures." {Ibid,y Oct. 
6/14.) 

Such opinions were worth much. 
For though it is a great thing to 
be welcomed, as our men were wel- 
comed, by a whole people, to have 
the hearty professional approval 
of its soldiers is a greater thing still. 

The Expeditionary Force, thus 
landed in France, was organized 
in two army corps — the First, 
consisting of the First and Second 



18 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

Divisions, under Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Sir Douglas Haig; the second, 
consisting of the Third and Fifth 
Divisions, under Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Sir James Grierson, who was 
succeeded, on his sudden and much 
lamented death, by General Sir 
Horace Smith-Dorrien. General 
AUenby commanded the cavalry 
division, consisting of the First, 
Second, Third, and Fourth Cavalry 
Brigades, and the Fifth Cavalry 
Brigade was commanded inde- 
pendently by Brigadier-General 
Sir Philip Chetwode. By the eve- 
ning of Friday, August 21, the 
concentration was practically com- 
plete, and during Saturday the 22d 
the Force moved up to its position 
on the left or western extremity of 
the French line. (Plan 1.) 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 19 

The general situation in this 
region, as it was known at the mo- 
ment to the leaders of the Allies, 
may be briefly stated. It was at 
last plain, after much uncertainty, 
that the first great shock and colli- 
sion of forces was destined to take 
place in this northern area. It was 
plain, also, that Belgium, for some 
time to come, was out of the 
scheme. Liege had fallen, and with 
it how many hopes and predictions 
of the engineer! Brussels was oc- 
cupied; and the Belgian field army 
was retiring to shelter under the 
ramparts of Antwerp. Except for 
Namur, there was nothing in Bel- 
gium north of the Allied line to 
stop the German advance. Von 
Kluck and Von Buelow, with the 
First and Second German Armies, 



20 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

were marching without opposition 
towards the French frontier — 
Von Kluck towards the south- 
west and Von Buelow towards the 
crossings of the Sambre» By the 
evening of the 20th, Von Buelow's 
guns were bombarding Namur. So 
much was known to the leaders 
of the AUies : of the strength of the 
advancing armies they knew Uttle. 
To oppose these two armies — 
for of the seven German armies 
already in position we shall con- 
sider only these two — the Allies 
were disposed as follows: Directly 
in the route of Von Buelow's army, 
should he pass Namur, lay the 
Fifth French Army, under General 
Lanrezac, with its left resting on 
the river Sambre at Charleroi, and 
its right in the fork of the Meuse 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 21 

and the Sambre. This army, it 
should be noted, made a junction 
in the river fork with another 
French Army, the Fourth, under 
General Ruffey, which lay off to 
the south along the Middle Meuse, 
watching the Ardennes. On the 
left of the Fifth French Army, 
along a line presently to be de- 
fined, lay the British Expeditionary 
Force, facing, as it seemed, with 
equal directness, the line of ad- 
vance of the army of Von Kluck. 
Subsidiary to the Fifth French 
Army and the British Force were 
two formations, available for sup- 
port : a cavalry corps of three divi- 
sions under General Sordet, sta- 
tioned to the south of Maubeuge, 
and, out to the west, with its base 
at Arras, a corps of two reserve 



22 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

divisions under General D'Amade. 
Both these formations will be 
heard of during the subsequent op- 
erations, and it is important to re- 
mark that General D'Amade's two 
divisions were at this time, and 
throughout the first days of the 
fighting, the only considerable 
body of Allied troops in the eighty 
miles of territory between the Brit- 
ish and the sea. 

The line occupied by the British 
ran due east from the neighbour- 
hood of Conde along the straight 
of the Conde-Mons Canal, round 
the loop which the canal makes 
north of Mons, and then, with a 
break, patrolled by cavalry, turned 
back at almost a right angle to- 
wards the southeast of the direction 
of the Mons-Beaumont road. The 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 23 

whole of the canal line, including 
the loop round Mons, — a front of 
nearly twenty miles, — was held 
by the Second Army Corps, and 
the First Army Corps lay off to 
its right, holding the southeastern 
line to a point about nine miles 
from Mons. There being no in- 
fantry reserves available in this 
small force. General Allenby's 
cavalry division was employed to 
act on the flank or in support of 
any threatened part of the line. 
The forward reconnaissance was 
entrusted to the Fifth Cavalry 
Brigade, assisted by some squad- 
rons from General Allenby's divi- 
sion, and some of its detachments 
penetrated as far north as Soignies, 
nine miles on the way to Brussels. 
In the occasional encounters which 



24. OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

took place with the enemy's Uhlans, 
to the north and east, our cavalry 
had always the best of it; then, as 
always in this war, when the op- 
portunity has occurred, mounted 
or dismounted, they have proved 
themselves the better arm. Their 
reconnaissance was more than sup- 
plemented by four squadrons of the 
Royal Flying Corps under the di- 
rection of Major-General Sir David 
Henderson. 

Throughout the Saturday our 
men entrenched themselves, the 
North-Countrymen among them 
finding in the chimney-stacks and 
slag-heaps of this mining district 
much to remind them of home. The 
line they held was clearly not an 
easy line to defend. No salient 
ever is, and a glance at the map 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 25 

will show that this was no common 
salient. To the sharp apex of Mons 
was added, as an aggravation, the 
loop of the canal. It was never- 
theless the best line available, and, 
once adopted, had been occupied 
with that double view both to de- 
fence and to attack which a good 
commander has always before him. 
The first object, when an enemy of 
unknown strength attacks, is to 
hold him and gain time; the line of 
the canal supplies just the obstacle 
required; it was therefore held, in 
spite of the salient, and arrange- 
ments made for a withdrawal of 
the Second Corps should the salient 
become untenable. If, on the other 
hand, the enemy should be beaten 
back, the Second Corps, pivoting 
northeast on Mons, could cross 



26 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the canal and move forward in line 
with the First Corps, aheady in 
position for such an advance. If, 
finally, — for a commander, like 
a good parent, must provide for 
everything, — a general retirement 
should become necessary, the 
British Commander-in-Chief had 
decided to rest his right flank 
on Maubeuge, twelve miles south 
of Mons: and here was his First 
Corps ready for it, clustered about 
the roads that lead towards Mau- 
beuge, and able, from this advan- 
tage, to cover the retirement of the 
Second Corps, which had fewer 
facilities in this way, and would 
have farther to travel. Tactically 
the arrangements were as good as 
could be made. 

When we come to the strength 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 27 

and direction of the enemy's at- 
tack, we are on more doubtful 
ground. His strength on the Brit- 
ish front was estimated at the time, 
according to all the available in- 
formation, both French and Eng- 
lish, to be at most two army corps, 
with perhaps one cavalry division, 
which would have made an equal 
battle; and it was not unnaturally 
supposed that he would attack in 
the general direction of his advance ; 
that is, from the northeast. From 
an attack in this strength and from 
this direction we had nothing to 
fear. As it turned out, however, 
both the estimate of strength and 
the supposition of direction were 
inaccurate. The enemy, making 
full use of the wooded country in 
these parts, which gave excellent 



28 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

concealment, and strong enough to 
throw his forces wide, was, as we 
shall see, engaged on something 
much more ambitious; a move- 
ment which, had it succeeded (as 
against any other troops it might 
well have succeeded), would have 
brought disaster on the whole Al- 
lied army. 

At what hour precisely the Ger-^ 
mans began their attack on the 
Mons position is uncertain. Some 
say at dawn, others just after noon. 
What is certain is that between 12 
and 1 P.M. on Sunday the 23d, 
some of the men of the Royal West 
Kents, in support on the outskirts 
of Mons, were having a sing-song 
and watching the people home 
from church, and, feeling quite at 
their ease, had sent their shirts and 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 29 

socks out to wash, for all the world 
as if on manoeuvres. It is an inter- 
esting little scene, and one which 
would have seemed incomprehen- 
sible to the Germans, who by this 
time pictured our little army cow- 
ering in its positions. The abrupt- 
ness with which the scene changed 
is no less characteristic. When it 
was reported that the enemy had 
turned up "at last" and that "A" 
company was hard-pressed at the 
canal, there was no more thought 
of sing-songs nor even of the dinner 
"which the orderlies had just gone 
to fetch"; socks and shirts ap- 
peared as if by miracle; and when 
the "fall-in" went, every man was 
there, equipped and ready for any- 
thing. It is an ordinary incident, 
and for that reason important; in 



30 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

any institution, whether it be an 
army or a household, it is the or- 
dinary incidents that count. It is 
typical of the spirit of an army 
which has puzzled many even of 
its admirers by its strange combi- 
nation of qualities: boyish ease and 
hilarity coupled with manly forti- 
tude and discipline, and a most 
perfect and unassailable confidence 
in its weapons, its leaders, and it- 
self. 

The attack had most certainly 
begun; and it began, as was ex- 
pected, at the weakest and most 
critical point of the line, the canal 
loop, which was held by the Third 
Division. This division had the 
heaviest share of the fighting 
throughout the day, maintaining, 
longer than seemed humanly pos- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 31 

sible, a hopeless position against 
hopeless odds, the Second Royal 
Irish and Fourth Middlesex of the 
Eighth Brigade, and the Fourth 
Royal Fusiliers of the Ninth Bri- 
gade, particularly distinguishing 
themselves. The bridges over the 
canal, which our men held, after 
some preliminary shelling, were 
attacked by infantry debouching 
from the low woods which at this 
point came down to within three 
hundred or four hundred yards of 
the canal. These woods were of 
great assistance to the enemy, 
both here and at other points of 
the canal, in providing cover for 
their infantry and machine-guns. 
The odds were very heavy. One 
company of the Royal Fusiliers, 
holding the Nimy Bridge, was 



32 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

attacked at one time by as many 
as four battalions. The enemy at 
first came on in masses, and suf- 
fered severely in consequence. It 
was their first experience of the 
British "fifteen rounds a minute," 
and it told. They went down in 
bundles — our men delighting in a 
form of musketry never contem- 
plated in the Regulations. To 
men accustomed to hitting bob- 
bing heads at eight hundred yards 
there was something monstrous 
and incredible in the German ad- 
vance. They could scarcely be- 
Heve their eyes; such targets had 
never appeared to them even in 
their dreams. Nor were our ma- 
chine-guns idle. In this, as in 
many other actions that day and in 
the days that followed, our ma- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 33 

chine-guns were handled with a 
skill and devotion which no one 
appreciated more than the enemy. 
Two of the first Victoria Crosses 
of the war were won by machine- 
gunners in this action of the 
bridges: Lieutenant Dease, of the 
Royal Fusiliers, who, though five 
times wounded, — and, as it turned 
out, mortally wounded, — contin- 
ued to work his gun on the Nimy 
Bridge until the order came for re- 
tirement, and he was carried off; 
and Private Godley, of the Royal 
Scots Fusiliers, who, lower down 
the loop, at the Ghlin Bridge, in 
the face of repeated assaults, kept 
his gun in action throughout. 

The attack had now spread along 
the whole line of the canal; but ex- 
cept at the loop the enemy could 



34 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

make no impression. There, how- 
ever, numbers told at last, and 
about the middle of the afternoon 
the Third Division was ordered to 
retire from the salient, and the 
Fifth Division on its left directed 
to conform. Bridges were blown 
up — the Royal Engineers vying 
with the other services in the 
race for glory: and by the night of 
the 23d, after various vicissitudes, 
the Second Army Corps had fallen 
back as far as the line Montreuil- 
Wasmes-Paturages-Frameries. 
That the retirement, though suc- 
cessful, was expensive, is not to be 
wondered at, when it is remem- 
bered that throughout this action, 
as we now know, the Second Army 
Corps was outnumbered by three 
to one. All ranks, however, were 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 35 

in excellent spirits. Allowing for 
handicaps, they felt that they had 
proved themselves the better men. 
It was a feeling which was to be 
severely tried in the next few days. 
At 5 P.M. on Sunday the 23d, as 
the Second Corps was withdrawing 
from the canal, the British Com- 
mander-in-Chief received a most 
unexpected telegraph from General 
Joffre, the Generalissimo of the 
Allied armies, to the effect that at 
least three German army corps were 
moving against the British front, 
and that a fourth corps was en- 
deavouring to outflank him from 
the west. He was also informed 
that the Germans had on the pre- 
vious day captured the crossings of 
the Sambre between Charleroi and 
Namur, and that the French on his 



30 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

right were retiring. In other words, 
Namur, the defensive pivot of the 
Anglo-French Hne, on the resist- 
ance of which — if only for a few 
days — the AUied strategy had 
depended, had fallen almost at a 
blow. By Saturday the Germans 
had left Namur behind, and in 
numbers far exceeding French pre- 
dictions had seized the crossings 
of the Sambre and Middle Meuse 
and were hammering at the junc- 
tion of the Fifth and Fourth 
French Armies in the river-fork. 
The junction was pierced, and the 
French, unexpectedly and over- 
whelmingly assaulted both in front 
and flank, could do nothing but 
retire. By 5 p.m. on the Sunday, 
when the message was received at 
British Headquarters, the French 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 37 

had been retiring for anywhere 
from ten to twelve hours. The 
British Army was for the moment 
isolated. Standing forward a day's 
march from the French on its 
right, faced and engaged by three 
German corps in front, and already 
threatened by a fourth corps on its 
left, it seemed a force marked out 
for destruction. 

In the British Higher Command, 
however, there was no flurry. There 
is a thing called British phlegm. 

The facts of the case, though 
unwelcome, were laconically ac- 
cepted. Over General Headquar- 
ters brooded a clubroom calm. Air- 
men were sent up to confirm the 
French report, in the usual manner, 
and arrangements were quietly and 
methodically made for a retirement 



38 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

towards the prearranged Mau- 
beuge-Valenciennes line. The hard- 
pressed Second Corps, which had 
farther to march, was the first to 
move. Early on the 24th it was 
marching south towards Dour and 
Quarouble, covered by the First 
Corps, which had been much less 
taxed, and was favourably placed 
to threaten the German left. This 
covering demonstration was well 
carried out by the Second Division, 
supported by the massed artillery 
of the corps. The retirement of the 
Second Corps, however, even with 
this assistance, was not made with- 
out much difficulty. By the night 
of the 23d the enemy were already 
crossing the canal, and pouring 
down on the villages to the south. 
Several rear-guard actions were 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 39 

fought here on the morning of the 
24th, in which infantry and artil- 
lery equally distinguished them- 
selves at Wasmes with notable suc- 
cess and much loss to the enemy; 
but, as every hour passed, the inten- 
tion of the enemy to outflank from 
the northwest became more evi- 
dent. Desperate fighting took place, 
the First Norfolks, First Cheshires, 
and One Hundred and Nineteenth 
Battery, R.F.A., detached as a 
flank guard under Colonel Ballard, 
of the Norfolks, holding the ridge 
from Audregnies to Flouges for 
several hours in the teeth of over- 
whelming opposition. To this little 
band, which cheerfully sacrificed 
itself, belongs the principal credit 
for holding up the turning move- 
ment of the enemy during the re- 



40 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

tirement of the 24th. They made 
a splendid stand, and six hundred 
of the Cheshires never got away. 
Our cavalry, fortunately, were 
able to help also, and at once; for 
by an act of great foresight, long 
before the news arrived of a turn- 
ing movement. Sir John French 
had transferred his cavalry division 
from the right flank to the left. 
They were in position there by the 
Sunday morning, and in the sub- 
sequent retirement did everything 
that men and horses could do to 
relieve the pressure. The dramatic 
action of General de Lisle's cavalry 
brigade at Audregnies, where the 
Fifth Division was hard-pressed, 
is one of the best-known incidents 
of this day's fighting, not only be- 
cause it succeeded, though at a 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 41 

heavy cost, in delaying the enemy, 
but because it gave occasion to one 
of the most heroic performances of 
the Retreat. 

When the action was drawing to 
a close, and men, horses, and bat- 
teries were being withdrawn, Cap- 
tain Francis Grenfell, of the Ninth 
Lancers, observed that the One 
Hundred and Nineteenth Battery, 
R.F.A., was in dij05culties. All the 
horses of the battery had been 
killed, most of its personnel had 
been killed or wounded, and it 
looked as if the guns would have 
to be left. Captain Grenfell, though 
himself wounded, determined to 
help, and rode out to look for a 
way of retreat for the guns. Hav- 
ing found it, to show how little a 
cavalryman need care for death, he 



42 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

rode his horse back, under a tem- 
pest of fire, at a walk, and called 
for volunteers from the Lancers, 
reminding them that "the Ninth 
had never failed the gunners." 
After such an example the re- 
sponse could be nothing but brisk. 
He returned with his volunteers 
("eleven officers and some forty 
men"), and under a fierce and in- 
cessant fire the guns were man- 
handled into safety. For this fine 
action Captain Grenfell and the 
battery commander — Major Alex- 
ander — were each awarded the 
Victoria Cross. It is one of many 
illustrations furnished by the Re- 
treat of the camaraderie of the 
various arms. 

After a short halt and partial en- 
trenchment on the line Dour- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 43 

Quarouble, to enable the First 
Corps to break off its demonstra- 
tions, the retreat of the Second 
Corps was resumed; and by the 
evening of the 24th the whole 
army had reached the prearranged 
line Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge — • 
the Second Corps to the west of 
Bavai, and the First Corps to the 
right. The right was protected by 
the fortress of Maubeuge, the left 
by the cavalry, operating outwards, 
and by the Nineteenth Infantry 
Brigade, which had been brought 
up in the nick of time from the 
lines of communication, and had 
acted throughout the day in support 
of the exposed flank of the Second 
Corps. 

It had been intended by the 
British Commander-in-Chief to 



44 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

make a stand on the Maubeuge 
line, and if the first calculations of 
the enemy's strength and inten- 
tions had proved correct, it is pos- 
sible that a great battle might 
have been fought here, and con- 
tinued by the French armies along 
the whole fortress line of northern 
France. Even as it was, the temp- 
tation to linger at Maubeuge must 
have been strong; it offered such 
an inviting buttress to our right 
flank, and filled so comfortably 
that dangerous gap between our 
line and the French. The tempta- 
tion, to which a weaker commander 
might have succumbed, was re- 
sisted. "The French were still re- 
tiring," says the despatch, "and I 
had no support except such as was 
afforded by the fortress of Mau- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 45 

beuge; and the determined at- 
tempts of the enemy to get round 
my left flank assured me that it 
was his intention to hem me against 
that place and surround me. I felt 
that not a moment must be lost in 
retiring to another position." 

Early on the 25th, accordingly, 
the whole British Army set out 
on the next stage of its retreat. 
Its function in the general Allied 
strategy was now becoming clear. 
It was not merely fighting its own 
battles. Situated as it was on the 
left flank of the retiring French 
Armies, it had become in effect the 
left flank-guard of the Allied line, 
committed to its retirement, and to 
the protection of that retirement, 
to the end. The turning movement 
from the west, at first local and 



46 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

partial, had suddenly acquired a 
strategic significance. It threat- 
ened not merely the British Army, 
but the whole Allied strategy of 
the Retreat. Could the British re- 
sist it? Could they, at the least, 
delay it.^ These were the questions 
which the French leaders asked 
themselves, with some anxiety, as 
they retired with their armies from 
day to day, and waited for the 
counter-turn which was to come. 
For, as we now know, behind the 
retiring and still intact French 
Armies, to the south and east of 
Paris, movements were shaping, 
forces were forming, which were to 
change the face of things in this 
western corner. Could the British 
hold out till these movements were 
ripe.^ It was a momentous ques- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 47 

tion. No more momentous ques- 
tion has been asked for a hundred 
years. The answer, so far, had 
been affirmative. 

On this day, the 25th, from very 
early in the morning, the two corps 
marched south on each side of the 
great Forest of Mormal, the First 
Corps to the right and the Second 
to the left, as one faces the enemy. 
The position chosen for the next 
stand was in the neighbourhood of 
Le Cateau, on the line Cambrai-Le 
Cateau-Landrecies, and while the 
army was marching towards it, 
civilian labour was employed to 
prepare and entrench the ground. 
On this morning, also, the infantry 
of the Fourth Division, which had 
arrived at Le Cateau on the 23d 
and 24th, became available for 



48 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

service, bringing a welcome addi- 
tion to our strength of eleven bat- 
talions. They were immediately 
sent forward, and, facing north- 
west between Solesmes and the 
Cambrai-Le Cateau road, materi- 
ally assisted the retirement of the 
Second Corps. For both corps it 
was a day of terrible marching, 
along roads crowded with trans- 
port and — particularly on the 
eastern route — packed with refu- 
gees. For marching in a retreat 
has this fundamental disadvantage, 
that the men move behind their 
transport, and (in friendly country) 
with all the civilians of the country- 
side about their feet. In such con- 
ditions a steady pace is the last 
thing to be hoped for. Checking 
— the curse of tired men — from 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 49 

being the exception becomes the 
rule; while the hours crawl on, and 
the boots tell, and the packs tell, 
and the eye grows glazed with 
staring at the men in front, and 
even the rifle, that "best friend," 
seems duller and heavier than a 
friend should be — the heaviest 
nine pounds in the world. It is 
calculated that on the 25th the 
various units of the Second Corps 
marched, under these most trying 
conditions, anything from twenty 
to thirty-five miles. By this time, 
also, the continual retirement was 
having its effect on the men's 
spirits. To the rank and file, who 
necessarily know nothing of high 
strategy, and see only what is be- 
fore their eyes, the Retreat carried 
little of that high significance which 



50 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

we attach to it, but much of weari- 
ness and distaste. Some ghmmer- 
ing of an idea that we were "lead- 
ing the Germans into a trap" 
cheered men up here and there; 
some rumours of Russian victories 
raised the old jokes about "Berlin " ; 
but for the most part they marched 
and fought uncomprehending, wel- 
coming their turn of rear guard 
as a relief, because it gave some 
chance of fighting and turned their 
faces to the north. 

The Second Corps reached their 
appointed line on the Cambrai-Le 
Cateau road as night was falling, 
and, under a cold, steady rain, 
which had succeeded the blazing 
heat of the day, proceeded to im- 
prove the trenches which they 
found there. They had had an ex- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 51 

hausting march, but little fighting 
or interruption. The First Corps 
was delayed and did not reach the 
allotted position; but was scat- 
tered by the evening over an area 
at some points as many as thirty 
miles from the Second Corps, and 
nowhere nearer than Landrecies, 
eight miles from Le Cateau. The 
difficulty of movement had been 
increased by the convergence of 
French troops retiring from the 
Sambre, who cut across our line of 
march. The enemy pressure was 
continued by fresh troops well into 
the night. The engagement of the 
Second Division south and east of 
Maroilles, and the fight of the 
Fourth (Guards') Brigade at Lan- 
drecies, are the two main inci- 
dents in this diflBicult night's work. 



52 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

About the fighting near Maroilles 
we have little information except 
that it seemed serious enough to 
justify the British Commander-in- 
Chief in asking for help from the 
French. In response to his urgent 
request two French reserve divi- 
sions attached to the Fifth French 
Army on our right eventually 
came up, and by diverting the at- 
tention of the enemy enabled Sir 
Douglas Haig to efifect a skilful 
extrication from an awkward po- 
sition made still more awkward by 
the darkness of night. One inci- 
dent of the fighting near Maroilles 
has, indeed, slipped into the light 
of day with regard to a unit of the 
Second Division: a little rear- 
guard action of the First Berks, 
near a bridge over the Petit Helpe 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 53 

which it was important to hold. 
They were on their way back to 
it, stumbling in the dark along a 
greasy, narrow causeway, with a 
deep ditch on each side, which led 
to the bridge. "The Germans, as 
it turned out, had already forced 
the bridge and were in the act of 
advancing along the causeway; 
and in the pitch darkness of the 
night the two forces suddenly 
bumped one into the other. Neither 
side had fixed bayonets, for fear of 
accidents in the dark, and in the 
scrimmage which followed it was 
chiefly a case of rifle-butts and 
fists. At this game the Germans 
proved no match for our men, and 
were gradually forced back to the 
bridgehead, where they were held 
for the remainder of the night." 



64 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

Early in the morning the Germans 
withdrew, and the First Berks fell 
back on the rest of the Second Di- 
vision, along the road to Guise. It 
was a very complete and satisfac- 
tory Httle affair. 

The fight at Landrecies by the 
Fourth (Guards') Brigade is better 
known. They had arrived there, 
very weary, and had got into bil- 
lets; so weary, indeed, that the 
Commander-in-Chief could not or- 
der them farther west, to fill up 
the gap between Le Cateau and 
Landrecies. "The men were ex- 
hausted, and could not get farther 
in without rest." The enemy, how- 
ever, would not allow them this 
rest. At 8.30 in the evening came 
news that Germans in motor- 
lorries were coming through the 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 55 

Forest of Mormal in great numbers, 
and bearing down upon the town. 
The town, fortunately, had already 
been put into a hasty state of de- 
fence: houses loopholed, machine- 
guns installed, barricades erected, 
and a company detailed to each of 
the many exits. It is said that the 
Germans advanced singing French 
songs, and that the leading ranks 
wore French uniforms, for a 
moment deceiving the defenders. 
This would explain the sudden- 
ness of the collision, for the Ger- 
mans and British were fighting 
hand to hand almost at once. It 
was a fierce fight while it lasted, 
and, with short respites, went on 
till the early hours of the morning; 
but eventually the enemy were 
beaten off with great loss. It is 



56 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

estimated that they lost in this 
action from 700 to 1000 men. It 
must be allowed, nevertheless, in 
the light of later knowledge that 
the tactics of the Germans at 
Maroilles and Landrecies were 
good. A few battalions — for it 
is unlikely that they amounted to 
more — attacking at various points 
under cover of darkness with a 
great show of vigour, though beaten 
off, succeeded in conveying the 
impression to the British com- 
manders in this part of the field 
that they were engaged with a 
considerable force. This impres- 
sion once conveyed, the main ob- 
ject of the manoeuvre had been 
attained, for the First Corps was 
kept on the alert all night, and 
effectually prevented either from 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 57 

obtaining rest or from reaching its 
appointed destination in the Brit- 
ish Hne. If our assumption of the 
enemy numbers is correct, it was 
a clever piece of work, well con- 
ceived and well executed. 

The crisis of the Retreat was 
now approaching. There is a limit 
to what men can do, and it seemed 
for a moment as if this limit might 
be reached too soon. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief, seriously consid- 
ering the accumulating strength of 
the enemy, the continued retire- 
ment of the French, his exposed 
left flank, the tendency of the 
enemy's western corps to envelop 
him, and above all, the exhausted 
and dispersed condition of his 
troops, decided to abandon the Le 
Cateau position, and to press on 



68 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the Retreat till he could put some 
substantial obstacle, such as the 
Somme or the Oise, between his 
men and the enemy, behind which 
they might reorganize and rest. 
He therefore ordered his corps 
commanders to break oflE whatever 
action they might have in hand, 
and continue their retreat as soon 
as possible towards the new St. 
Quentin line. 

The First Corps was by this 
time terribly exhausted, but^ on 
receiving the order, set out from its 
scattered halting-places in the early 
hours of the 26th. 

By dawn on that day the whole 
corps, including the Fourth Brigade 
at Landrecies, was moving south 
towards St. Quentin. 

The order to retire at daybreak, 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 59 

on which the First Corps was now 
acting, had been duly received by 
the Second Corps. The commander 
had been informed that the retire- 
ment of the First Corps was to con- 
tinue simultaneously and that three 
divisions of French cavalry under 
General Sordet were moving to- 
wards his left flank, in pursuance 
of an agreement arrived at in 
a personal interview between the 
French cavalry commander and 
the British Commander-in-Chief. 

Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was also 
informed that two French Ter- 
ritorial Divisions under General 
D'Amade were moving up to sup- 
port Sordet. 

There was no reason to suppose 
that the Second Corps, which had 
not been so much harassed by the 



60 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

enemy on its march south as the 
First Corps, was not equally well 
able to obey the order to retreat. 

The corps commander, however, 
judged that his men were too tired 
and the enemy too strong to effect 
such a retirement as he was directed 
to carry out. 

The General's reply was duly 
received at Headquarters. The 
Commander-in-Chief was deeply 
engaged in concerting plans with 
the French Commander-in-Chief, 
his Chief of the Staff, and General 
Lanzerac (the commander of the 
Fifth French Army). Orders were 
immediately sent to the Second 
Corps, informing the General that 
any delay in retiring would seri- 
ously compromise the plan of the 
Allied operations, and, in view of 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 61 

the general situation, might entail 
fatal results. He was directed to 
resume his retirement forthwith, 
and, to assist him, the cavalry and 
Fourth Division were placed under 
his orders. 

At the conclusion of the confer- 
ence, no positive information hav- 
ing been received of the commence- 
ment of the retirement, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief himself set out 
for Le Cateau; but the congestion 
of the roads with Belgian refugees, 
etc., made progress so slow that he 
had not accomplished half the 
distance before he found that his 
orders had been carried out and 
the retirement was in progress. 

During the early part of the day, 
however. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien 
had, for the reason given above. 



6d OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

waited at the Le Cateau position 
to engage the pursuing Germans. 
Of the three divisions of infantry 
thus engaged, the Fifth lay on the 
right, the Third in the centre, and 
the Fourth faced outwards on the 
left: the whole occupying the ridge 
south of the Cambrai-Le Cateau 
road, on the line Haucourt-Caudry- 
Beaumont-Le Cateau. The Nine- 
teenth Infantry Brigade was in 
reserve and the cavalry operated 
on the flanks. With both flanks 
exposed, with three divisions of 
infantry to the enemy's seven, and 
faced by the massed artillery of 
four army corps, — an odds of four 
or five to one, — the Second Corps 
and Fourth Division prepared to 
make a stand. A few hours' sleep, 
and at dawn, with a roar of guns, 
the battle opened. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 63 

That the day was critical, that 
it was all or nothing, was realized 
by all ranks. Everything was 
thrown into the scale; nothing was 
held back. Regiments and batter- 
ies, with complete self-abandon- 
ment, faced hopeless duels at im- 
possible ranges; brigades of cavalry 
on the flanks boldly threatened 
divisions; and in the half -shel- 
ter of their trenches the infan- 
try, withering but never budging, 
grimly dwindled before the Ger- 
man guns. It was our first expe- 
rience on a large scale of modern 
artillery in mass. For the first six 
hours the guns never stopped. To 
our infantry it was a time of stub- 
born and almost stupefied endur- 
ance, broken by lucid intervals of 
that deadly musketry which had 



64 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

played such havoc with the Ger- 
mans at Mons. To our artillery it 
was a duel, and perhaps of all the 
displays of constancy and devotion 
in a battle where every man in 
every arm of the service did his 
best, the display of the gunners 
was the finest. For they accepted 
the duel quite cheerfully, and made 
such sport with the enemy's in- 
fantry that even their masses 
shivered and recoiled. By midday, 
however, many of our batteries 
were out of action, and the enemy 
infantry had advanced almost to 
the main Cambrai-Le Cateau road, 
behind which our men, in their 
pathetic civilian trenches, were 
quietly waiting. 

The enemy attacked on the right 
of the Fifth Division, and were in 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 65 

the act of turning it when the order 
came to retire. This necessary- 
order, for a gradual retirement 
from the right, was issued a Httle 
before 3 p.m., and was with great 
difficulty conveyed to all parts 
of the line. In the Fifth Division 
several companies, in covering the 
retirement, were practically wiped 
out. The story of "B" Company 
of the Second K.O.Y.L.I. charg- 
ing the enemy with its nineteen 
remaining men, headed by its com- 
mander, is typical of the spirit 
which inspired the British regi- 
ments. 

The Third Division had suffered 
comparatively little when the order 
reached them, and were justly 
priding themselves on having suc- 
cessfully repulsed a determined at- 



66 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

tack on Caudry, the apex of the 
position. 

On the left of the Hne was posted 
the Fourth Division which had 
come in by train the previous day, 
and was personally placed by the 
Commander-in-Chief in the posi- 
tion he thought best to cover the 
retirement of the Second Corps. 

Owing to the unexpected turn of 
events at Mons, and the unfortu- 
nate delay in the despatch of this 
division from England, the troops 
had to be pushed into action with- 
out a moment's delay, and before 
the detrainment of their artillery 
and other services was practically 
complete. 

On the morning of the 26th they 
found themselves on the extreme 
western flank of the Allied forces. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 67 

and splendidly did General Snow 
and his gallant men carry out the 
difficult and dangerous task as- 
signed them. 

The conduct of their retirement 
was no less efficient than their gal- 
lant fighting. Parts of this division, 
however, shared the fate of other 
units in the line engaged in cover- 
ing the retirement, and, holding 
on into the night, either retired in 
the darkness (some to the British 
lines, others through the German 
lines to the sea) or, less fortunate, 
were cut off, captured, or destroyed. 
Many adventures befell them, and 
some tragedies, but none to equal 
the tragedy of the First Gordons, 
who marched in the darkness into 
a^German division in bivouac some 
miles south of the battle-ground. 



68 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

and were shot or taken prisoners 
almost to a man. 

The infantry retirement, though 
thus partial and irregular, was pro- 
gressively carried out according to 
orders, and by four o'clock in the 
afternoon most of the line had been 
cleared. The retirement was cov- 
ered by the artillery, still in action 
with the same unruflSed courage 
and devotion which they had shown 
throughout the day, and there is no 
doubt that the reluctance of the 
enemy to engage in an energetic 
pursuit was partly due to this 
splendid opposition of our gunners, 
as well as to the undoubtedly 
heavy losses which they had suf- 
fered from our rifle and shell fire 
earlier in the day. At any rate, the 
pursuit was not pressed, and by 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 69 

nightfall, after another long and 
weary march, — how weary, after 
such a day, can scarcely be ex- 
pressed, — the remams of the Sec- 
ond Corps and the Fourth Divi- 
sion halted and bivouacked. It was 
pouring with rain, but many slept 
where they halted, by the roadside, 
too utterly worn to think of shelter. 
There is a pendant to this great 
action of the 26th which until re- 
cently has been missing from its 
place; and it has been a matter of 
much wonder, in consequence, how 
it was that things fell out as they 
did after the battle of Le Cateau, 
the weary British retiring before 
a numerous and victorious enemy 
which did not pursue. It was 
pointed out, indeed, that the en- 
emy had suffered heavy losses; that 



70 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

they were tired and shaken by the 
unexpected violence of the British 
defence; but when every allowance 
had been made for the effect of 
weariness and loss, it was plain 
that some other reason must still 
be found to account for a decision 
so repugnant to the German temper 
and the German plans. Reference 
has already been made to the 
promise made by Generals Sordet 
and D'Amade to the British Com- 
mander-in-Chief. If history has 
been slow to record it, let the delay 
be put down to the exigencies of 
war. The enemy were not only 
tired and shaken. They were also 
threatened, and threatened, as 
they very quickly discovered, in 
the most sensitive tentacles of their 
advance. It was about 4.30 on the 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 71 

afternoon of the 26th (so the story 
runs), when the British retirement 
had been in progress about an 
hour, that a furious cannonading 
was heard out towards the west. 
This was Sordet's cavalry, tired 
horses and all, arrived and engag- 
ing the German right. The ex- 
planation was confirmed by air- 
men later in the day, who reported 
having seen large bodies of French 
cavalry, with horse artillery and 
some battalions of infantry, driv- 
ing back the Germans out to- 
wards Cambrai. General Sordet 
and his cavalry, aided by General 
D'Amade's battalions, which had 
moved out from their station at 
Arras, were able to inflict upon the 
outflanking German right a blow 
which recoiled upon the whole of 



72 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the First German Army, and by its 
threatened significance more than 
by its actual strength dominated 
the poHcy of that army for sev- 
eral days to come. The German ad- 
vance wavered and paused, and 
for nearly twenty-four hours the 
British continued their retirement 
almost unmolested. 

Whether on the early morning of 
the 26th the left of the British line 
could have followed the example of 
the First Corps and continued its 
retreat, is a question which cannot 
be satisfactorily settled until the 
whole history of the war is laid 
bare. But there can be no doubt 
that both troops and commander 
richly deserved the high tribute 
paid them in the despatch of the 
British Commander-in-Chief, who, 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 73 

after praising the behaviour of va- 
rious arms, says : — 

"I cannot close this brief ac- 
count of the glorious stand of the 
British troops without putting on 
record my deep appreciation of the 
valuable services rendered by Sir 
H. Smith-Dorrien. 

"I say without hesitation that 
the saving of the left wing of the 
army under my command on the 
morning of the 26th August could 
never have been accomplished un- 
less a commander of rare and un- 
usual coolness, intrepidity, and 
determination had been present to 
personally conduct the operations." 

It is impossible to close the story 
of this, the most critical time of 
the great Retreat, without making 
mention of the inestimable services 



74 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

performed by the British cavalry 
under General Allenby. The moral 
superiority which they had so ef- 
fectually established over the hos- 
tile horsemen during the enemy's 
first advance on Mons, was main- 
tained and increased by every one 
of the many trials of strength 
which occurred all along the line 
between smaller and greater units 
of the two opposing cavalries. In- 
variably in all these encounters 
the German cavalry were driven 
behind the protection of their in- 
fantry and, thus hampering the lat- 
ter's advance, assisted our troops 
to make good their retreat. The 
quality of the horses and equip- 
ment of the British, their unrivalled 
efficiency in dismounted fighting 
and in knowledge of ground. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 75 

coupled with their intrepidity and 
dash whenever the smallest op- 
portunity for mounted attack pre- 
sented itself, enabled them effectu- 
ally to prevent that which is most 
dreaded by a retreating army — 
the enterprises of hostile horsemen. 

No praise can be too great for 
the British cavalry throughout 
this drastic initiation into the 
splendid work which they have in- 
variably performed throughout the 
campaign. 

It was in the early hours of 
the morning of the 27th that the 
commander of the Second Corps 
personally reported himseK at 
Headquarters. He informed the 
Commander-in-Chief that the Sec- 
ond Corps and Fourth Division 
had suffered heavily and were very 



76 OPEEATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

tired, but were now rapidly regain- 
ing order and cohesion. By dawn 
every available staff officer was en 
route for St. Quentin, and hour 
after hour, at their posts on the 
line of the Retreat, shepherded 
the troops towards their units, and 
the longed-for luxuries of food and 
drink and news. All through the 
morning detachments of every size 
and every conceivable composition 
kept filing past — some with offi- 
cers, most with none — some hob- 
bling and silent, others whistling 
and in step — but all with one 
accord most thoroughly persuaded 
(such are the fallacies of a retreat) 
that they were the last and only 
survivors of their respective com- 
mands. Many, after a brief halt, 
had marched all night, and up to 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 77 

one o'clock in the afternoon they 
were still coming in. A brief rest, 
some bread and coffee, and they 
were off once more, their troubles 
almost forgotten in the pleasure of 
rejoining their regiments and re- 
covering their friends. 

The general Retreat, which the 
battle of Le Cateau had so danger- 
ously interrupted, resumed once 
more its normal tenor. Of the be- 
haviour of the men during this 
trying period it is difficult to speak 
with moderation. They had passed 
through an ordeal, both physical 
and mental, such as few troops 
have ever had to face in their first 
week of war; and had displayed 
throughout a nobility of bearing 
and demeanour of which none who 
observed them can speak even now 



78 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

without emotion. Such courage 
and patience, such humorous resig- 
nation and cheerfulness in adver- 
sity, are to be paralleled only in 
the finest armies of history. 

The resumption of the general 
Retreat and the restoration of 
march routine among the forces of 
the British left had one immediate 
and important consequence. It 
became possible to deal with the 
chief remaining weakness caused 
by the inability of the First Corps, 
as already pointed out, to reach 
its allotted position on the eve- 
ning of the 25th. The First Corps 
had not been idle while the Second 
Corps fought; though never heavily 
engaged, it had been perpetually 
harassed, and was still, on August 
27, suffering from the wide dis- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 79 

persion of its forces on the 25 th. It 
was now moving south as best 
it could — keeping direction, but 
otherwise marching and bivouack- 
ing by brigades. On both flanks, 
indeed, throughout these early days 
of the Retreat, such was the im- 
minence of the enemy, and such 
the variety of fortunes of the differ- 
ent brigades — and even battalions 
and companies — of the same divi- 
sion during any one day, that no 
strict uniformity of march or of 
line could be looked for. It speaks 
well for the commanders of brigade 
and regimental units that so un- 
usually high a discretionary power 
was exercised so well, and with so 
little miscarriage either of in- 
dividual units or of the general 
scheme. Some mishaps, of course. 



80 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

there were, of companies and bat- 
talions overtaken, cut off, or sur- 
prised. The capture of the greater 
part of the Second Munster Fusi- 
hers at Bergues on the 26th is one 
of these incidents, to be set beside 
the destruction of the First Gor- 
dons, as part of the tragic waste 
inevitable in any continuous re- 
treat before superior numbers. It 
is memorable, not only because, 
like the First Gordons, the regi- 
ment involved carried a famous 
name, but because it gave occasion 
to our cavalry to show once more 
in their Retreat their devotion to 
duty. It was entirely due to the 
skilful and audacious dismounted 
action of two troops of the Fif- 
teenth Hussars that the battered 
remnant of the Munsters — about 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 81 

one hundred and fifty men — was 
saved from annihilation or sur- 
render. 

The Second Corps was still, on 
August 27, in advance of the First; 
but in both corps the Retreat con- 
tinued incessantly. Sleep was cut 
down to a minimum; men fed, 
drank, and slept as they could, and 
always, when they rose from the 
roadside and stretched themselves 
to a new dawn, the word was 
"March." Their chief enemy now 
was not the Germans, but the road, 
the blazing sun, and the limits 
of their own flesh and blood. The 
worst, however, was over. By 
August 27/28 movement by divi- 
sions began to be possible; and by 
August 28 movement by corps. 
By August 28/29 the whole Army 



82 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

was in touch once more on the line 
Noyon-La Fere, and on Sunday the 
29th, for the first time for eight 
days, the Army actually rested. 
It is a day they are never likely to 
forget. While the men rested, their 
commanders took stock; and before 
the march was resumed, brigades 
and divisions had been reorganized, 
stragglers restored, and deficien- 
cies of men and material ascer- 
tained and noted. The reorganiza- 
tion was completed by the arrival 
of Major-General Pulteney, and 
the constitution of the Fourth Di- 
vision and Nineteenth Infantry 
Brigade as a Third Army Corps 
under his command. 

The reorganization of the British 
Force coincided with a gratifying 
change in the Allied dispositions. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 83 

The British Army was not only in 
touch within itself, but in touch, 
also, on both its flanks, with the 
French; on the right, with the 
Fifth French Army, now, after 
many vicissitudes and much hard 
fighting, lying behind the Oise 
from La Fere to Guise; and on the 
left with a new French Army, still 
in process of formation, of which 
the nucleus was those same two 
divisions of infantry and three 
divisions of cavalry which General 
D'Amade and General Sordet had 
handled so much to our advantage 
on the afternoon of the 26th, and 
throughout the subsequent retire- 
ment. This Army (to be called 
henceforth, the Sixth) conscious of 
some mission above the ordinary, 
and daily increasing in strength, 



84 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

lay off, on the 29th, to the north- 
west of the British Hne, facing 
northeast with its right on Roye. 
It was a welcome change, removing 
none too soon that fear of isolation 
which had haunted all our move- 
ments. The situation of the British, 
scars and bruises notwithstanding, 
seemed suddenly almost promising, 
and with their flanks secured, for 
the first time since the Retreat be- 
gan, they enjoyed a genuine feeling 
of relaxation. It was a feeling, 
happily, which the enemy at the 
moment was unable to disturb. 
His strength was diverted to the 
two French Armies, and except for 
some cavalry actions, in which our 
troops as usual were completely 
successful, there was little activity 
on the British front. On the morn- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 85 

ing of the 29th, while our men were 
resting behind the Oise, the main 
body of the pursuit was still en- 
gaged in crossing the Somme. 

It was amazing to see how 
quickly the Army recovered during 
these days from the first strain 
of the Retreat. Even on the 28th 
the improvement was notable. 
A general cheerfulness pervaded 
the ranks, whence derived no one 
seemed to care, but splendid and 
infectious. Men toughened and 
hardened; the limpers grew fewer, 
and already battalions were to be 
met marching with the old swing to 
the old song. By the 29th — for 
always we come back to this cru- 
cial date — the first hard appren- 
ticeship was over; and when the 
Army rose from its sleep to take 



86 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the road once more, it looked and 
felt an army of veterans. Officers 
smiled as they watched their men, 
and speculated happily on the day 
to come. 

The chief difficulty now was to 
replace wastage in equipment, etc., 
which had been enormous. For in 
the strain and confusion of the Re- 
treat everything detachable had 
been lost or thrown away, and 
whole companies were found, per- 
fectly fitted out eight days before, 
which had now scarcely a single 
greatcoat, waterproof sheet, or 
change of clothing left. The de- 
ficiency of entrenching tools — to 
take only one article of equipment, 
though that, perhaps, the most 
easily lost — amounted, in the 
troops which had fought at Le Ca- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 87 

teau, to over eighty per cent. It 
was much easier, unfortunately, to 
tabulate these deficiencies than to 
supply them. The stores existed, in- 
deed, but they were not to be had. 
They were lying for the fetching 
on the quays and in the depots 
of Havre and Rouen and Boulogne, 
but every day's march took us 
farther away from them and in- 
creased their exposure to the Ger- 
man advance. With Amiens al- 
ready in the enemy's hands, and 
the Channel ports uncovered, we 
were, for a moment, that portent 
of the textbooks, an army without 
a base. It was a case for prompt 
measures, and prompt measures 
were taken. On August 29, while 
the Army was recounting deficien- 
cies on the Oise, the Inspector 



88 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

General of the lines of communica- 
tion, by order of the Commander- 
m-Chief 5 was arranging a grand re- 
moval to the mouth of the Loire, 
and on August 30, the new British 
base was temporarily established 
at St. Nazaire and Nantes, with 
Le Mans as advanced base in 
place of Amiens. It was a great 
achievement, but an unwelcome 
change, for both by sea and by 
land the distances were greater, 
and it had the inevitable conse- 
quence of delaying the arrival of 
everything on which the Army de- 
pended for replenishment. The in- 
fantry went without their great- 
coats and entrenching tools; and 
though reinforcements of men con- 
tinued to arrive at stated intervals, 
— the first reinforcement on Sep- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 89 

tember 5, and the second on Sep- 
tember 7 and 8, — the guns which 
should have come on August 29 
were not actually received till 
September 19. It was not until 
October 11, when the British Army 
was setting out for Flanders, that 
St. Nazaire was at last definitely 
closed down, and Havre and Bou- 
logne reopened in its place. It was 
a difficult period for the adminis- 
trative departments of the Army, 
and had its own triumphs. 

The lull in operations on the 
British front during the 29th, and 
the restoration of contact with the 
French, were turned to good ac- 
count by the Allied leaders, whose 
opportunities for meeting and ex- 
changing views had hitherto been 
rare. A conference was held in 



90 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the early afternoon at British 
Headquarters in Compiegne, which 
was attended not only by General 
JoflFre and Sir John French, but 
by the three British corps com- 
manders and General AUenby . The 
conference was presided over by 
the French Commander-in-Chief, 
who showed himself, then as al- 
ways, where the British were con- 
cerned, "most kind, cordial, and 
sympathetic." "He told me," says 
Sir John French, "that he had di- 
rected the Fifth French Army on 
the Oise to move forward and at- 
tack the Germans on the Somme, 
with a view to checking pursuit. 
He also told me of the formation 
of the Sixth French Army on my 
left flank, composed of the Seventh 
Army Corps, four reserve divisions. 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 91 

and Sordet's corps of cavalry." In 
conclusion, having dealt with the 
immediate necessities of the British, 
he outlined once more his strategic 
conception, to draw on the enemy 
at all points until a favourable situ- 
ation should be created for the de- 
sired offensive, and in conformity 
with that conception directed the 
Retreat to proceed. The bridges 
over the Oise were promptly de- 
stroyed, and at various hours be- 
tween mid-afternoon of the 29th 
and early morning of the 30th the 
British forces set out on a twenty- 
mile march to the Aisne, through 
beautiful country which they were 
no longer too tired to enjoy. By 
the afternoon of August 30, the 
whole Army was in position a few 
miles north of the line Compiegne- 



92 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

Soissons, and at the same time the 
Germans occupied La Fere. On 
the morning of August 31 the Re- 
treat was resumed, and from this 
date until September 4 continued 
practically from day to day in con- 
formity with the movements of 
the French, our men becoming 
daily fitter and more war-hardened. 
Rumours, however, of successful 
French actions on our flanks, and, 
amidst much that was vague and 
wearisome, a growing sense of com- 
bination and ulterior purpose in 
their movements, encouraged all 
ranks. 

The country now was much 
more difficult, for after the Forest 
of Compiegne is passed the land 
plunges into deep wooded ravines 
and break-neck roads, very trying 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 93 

for guns and transport, and for all 
manner of manoeuvres. The heat 
was intense, and, to make matters 
worse, the enemy pursuit, which 
had unaccountably languished, was 
becoming closer and more insist- 
ent. The British, bivouacked that 
night between Crepy-en-Valois and 
Villers-Cotteret, found themselves 
committed, on the morning of Sep- 
tember 1, to two of the hottest 
skirmishes of the Retreat; one at 
Villers-Cotteret, where the Fourth 
(Guards') Brigade was covering 
the retirement of the Second Divi- 
sion, the other on the left at Nery, 
in the area of the Third Corps. 

The action at Villers-Cotteret 
began about nine o'clock, in very 
difficult forest country, and con- 
tinued until after midday, the 



94 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

Guards' Brigade maintaining its 
ground, despite heavy losses, with 
a steadiness and determination 
worthy of the heroes of Landre- 
cies. It was an action easily de- 
scribed. The attack had been ex- 
pected, and was repulsed. In this 
action the Irish Guards, who had 
only been under distant shell fire 
at Mons and had had little to do 
at Landrecies, received their full 
baptism of fire. It was their first 
real fight, and their commanding 
officer headed the casualty list. 
The action at Nery was quite un- 
like the action at Villers-Cotteret, 
for it came as a surprise, and at one 
time looked like becoming a trag- 
edy. The first indication of danger 
had reached the Headquarters of 
the Second Corps at three o'clock 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 05 

in the morning, when a Frenchman 
reported having seen ''forty Ger- 
man guns and a large force of 
Uhlans" moving in the direction 
of the Third Corps, and more par- 
ticularly in the direction of Nery, 
where the First Cavalry Brigade 
with L Battery, R.H.A., was bil- 
leted, on the left front of the Brit- 
ish line. Except as regards the 
number of the guns the report 
proved to be true. The Germans, 
concealed from the British by a 
thick mist, — six regiments of cav- 
alry with two batteries of six gims 
each, — were in position by day- 
break on the steep ridge which 
overlooks the village, when an 
officer's patrol of the Eleventh 
Hussars bumped suddenly into 
them out of the mist. It is possi- 



96 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

ble that they were as much sur- 
prised as the British, for a mist 
works both ways; but they had 
the advantage in numbers, arma- 
ment, and position. The alarm 
was scarcely given when their guns 
opened on the village, and by five 
o'clock, when the sun rose, the 
fight was in full swing. 

It was a singular action, for 
though our cavalry, dismounted 
and hastily disposed, soon recov- 
ered from their surprise, nothing 
could alter the situation of L Bat- 
tery. Thanks to the mist, it had 
been caught in a position as un- 
suitable for action as could well be 
conceived. Unlimbered in an or- 
chard only four hundred yards off, 
and perfectly commanded by the 
German guns, it was throughout 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 97 

the fight a mere target for the 
enemy. A tornado of shell, ma- 
chine-gun, and rifle fire was di- 
rected upon it, the battery mean- 
while boldly replying, though its 
case was hopeless, and known to be 
hopeless, from the first. Soon only 
one of its guns was left in action, 
and on the serving of this one gun 
the attention of every surviving 
oflBcer and man was concentrated, 
one after another falling killed or 
wounded under the fire of the now 
exasperated enemy. Captain Brad- 
bury, loading, lost a leg; continued 
to direct, and lost the other, and 
was carried away to die so that, as 
he said, his men should not see his 
agony and be discouraged. When 
all the oflBcers had fallen, Sergeant- 
Major Dorrell took command, and 



98 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

aided by the machine-guns of the 
Eleventh Hussars, was still main- 
taining the hopeless duel when 
about eight o'clock the Fourth 
Cavalry Brigade arrived, and not 
long after the First Middlesex 
leading the Nineteenth Infantry 
Brigade. The balance was reversed, 
and the enemy, with, it is said, the 
one gun of L Battery still firing at 
them, retired in disorder towards 
Verrines, leaving eight of their 
twelve guns on the field. Whatever 
their mission, it remained unful- 
filled. In this action, in which a 
serious disaster was so successfully 
averted, the heroic performance of 
L Battery will always be memor- 
able. It had lost, during the en- 
gagement, all its officers and eighty 
per cent of its gun detachments 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 99 

killed or wounded, without betray- 
ing by so much as a sign either 
discouragement or defeat. Dis- 
tinctions were showered upon it, 
and Captain Bradbury, Sergeant- 
Major Dorrell, and Sergeant Nel- 
son were awarded the Victoria 
Cross. 

There is a sequel to this fight too 
exhilarating to be omitted. As the 
First and Fourth Cavalry Brigades 
were moving south next morning 
through the rides of the Forest of 
Ermenonville, they came on the 
tracks of horses and sent a troop to 
follow them up. "They found the 
ride strewn with German kit of all 
kinds, lame horses, etc., showing a 
hurried retreat. They had gone by 
five hours before, and turned out 
to be our Nery friends, the cavalry 



100 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

division, who had bumped into one 
of our columns and retreated rap- 
idly, leaving their four remaining 
guns." It was a very satisfactory 
finish, and had a fine effect on the 
whole Army. The story of the 
capture of the twelve guns ran like 
wildfire through the ranks, and 
was recorded with pleasure by the 
French in their communique. 

On September 2, very early in 
the morning, the Army was once 
more on the move. September 1 
had been a hard day, and at one 
time something like a general en- 
gagement was threatened on the 
left and left centre of the British 
line, the Fifth and Fourth Divisions 
fighting model rear-guard actions 
which had much to do with the in- 
activity of the enemy on the fol- 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 101 

lowing day. For on September 2 
the pursuit once more relaxed, and 
by the evening the British had 
reached the north bank of the 
Marne, and were already arrang- 
ing for the crossing on the follow- 
ing day. Both the march and the 
crossing had been contemplated 
with considerable misgiving by the 
Commander-in-Chief, for on Sep- 
tember 2 the Army was no longer 
retiring, as it had hitherto retired, 
in the direction of Paris, but, owing 
to the position of the bridges, had 
swung southeast and was now ex- 
ecuting what was in effect almost 
a flank march in the face of the 
enemy. The crossing of the Marne 
was an even more delicate opera- 
tion, for it involved, in circum- 
stances of comparative immobility. 



102 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

the same dangerous exposure to the 
enemy. The enemy, however, did 
nothmg to interrupt our opera- 
tions, and was, indeed, reported by 
our airmen to have swung south- 
east also, and to be moving in the 
direction of Chateau-Thierry, to- 
wards the front of the Fifth French 
Army. By the night of September 
3 the whole of the British troops 
were safely across the river and all 
the bridges blown up. The left of 
the British Army was now actually 
in sight of the outlying forts of 
Paris, and there was much excite- 
ment among all ranks as to our 
ultimate destination. Should we, 
after all, enter Paris, and sleep in 
the beds of la ville lumiere? It was 
not to be. A position was occupied 
between Lagny and Signy-Signets, 



THE RETREAT FROM MONS 103 

and on the following day, while the 
enemy was bridging the Marne, the 
British Army made the last stage 
of the Retreat, finishing up, in the 
cool of the evening, on the line 
Lagny-Courtagon. This was their 
"farthest south," and on Septem- 
ber 5, while they rested, the great 
news spread through the Army 
that the Retreat was over, and that 
next day the Advance would begin. 
It would be difficult to exaggerate 
the effect of the news. For though 
the Army had grown outwardly 
fitter and more cheerful during the 
last seven days, the profound dis- 
taste which was felt by all ranks 
for the perpetual retirement poi- 
soned every activity. Was it never 
to end, this Retreat? Were we 
retiring, then, to the Pyrenees? 



104 OPERATIONS OF BRITISH ARMY 

With such bitter questions and 
mock-humorous answers, they be- 
guiled the march. When the news 
came it was as if a great sickness 
had been hfted from their minds, 
and for the first time, perhaps, 
they reahzed fully, as men do when 
they rise from sickness, how in- 
finitely tired and weary they had 
been. They could scarcely believe 
the news; but it came from quar- 
ters not to be denied. The "fa- 
vourable situation" for which Gen- 
eral Joffre had been waiting so 
patiently had come at last. 



THE END 



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